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Clearly guided by criticisms of the Paskes ruling, and stating
that CPLR 203(e) must be "liberally interpreted," ' 4 the court
ruled that "there is no equitable (or legal) reason why a personal
injury action in the original pleading does not give notice of a
wrongful death, allegedly caused by the original negligent injury.
" 15
What must be borne in mind in relation to the question of
notice is that defendant was aware not only of the facts surround-
ing the personal injury claim in 1961, but was also served with a
summons and amended complaint including the wrongful death
action in 1964- prior to the tolling of the statute of limitations.
It could perhaps be argued that the instant case is not actually
applying the 203 (e) "relation back" to wrongful death as an action
per se, but rather is merely applying this statute to situations in
which there is actual as well as constructive notice from the plead-
ings. However, it would seem that both the language of the
court and the intention of the legislature were such as to include
any new claim, provided that "the original complaint gave notice
of the transaction out of which the amended complaint arose." '
CPLR 210(b): Time for commencement of action is not extended
where eighteen-month period after death of potential defendant
expired prior to the running of the statute of limitations.
CPLR 210(b) provides that a "period of eighteen months
after the death . . . of a person against whom a cause of action
exists is not a part of the time within which the action must be
commenced against his executor or administrator." This provi-
sion alleviates the difficulty which claimants have during the period
between the potential defendant's death and the appointment of an
executor or administrator of the estate.' 7  It leaves "substantially
unchanged" 1 its predecessor sections, CPA §§ 12 and 21, merely
Ulster County 1965), where, contrary to Paskes, relation back of a wrong-
ful death claim to a personal injury pleading was allowed. See criticism
and evaluation of Ringle v. Bass in The Biannual Survey of New York
Practice, 40 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 303, 307-08 (1966).l4Supra note 1, at 1077, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
IS Ibid.
16 Berlin v. Goldberg, 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 1075, 266 N.Y.S2d 475, 476
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct 1966).
17 1 WEINsTmN, KO RN & MILLER, Naw Yoan CiviL PRAcricE ff 210.04
(1965). "The Legislature seems to have recognized that there is inevitably
a period of time following the death of a person when it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to commence an action against his estate. In order, there-
fore, to prevent any hardships or loss of rights to a plaintiff under such
circumstances, the Legislature by the enactment of section 21 suspended the
running of the statute for a period of eighteen months after the death of the
person against whom a cause of action exists." Butler v. Price, 271
App. Div. 359, 362, 65 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (4th Dep't 1946).
Is FTTH REP. 46.
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consolidating and simplifying the technical distinctions between the
superseded provisions.' 9
In Schwartz v. Public Adm'r 20 however, the Supreme Court,
Bronx County, held that CPLR 210(b) created an alternative date
and not an extension of the statute of limitations after the death
of the person against whom an action could be brought Inter-
pretation of the statute as an extension, said the court, would be
"unconscionable." 21
The court seems not to have considered the judicial inter-
pretation of the statutory antecedents of CPLR 210(b). In Hall
v. Brennan,22 Section 403 of the Code of Civil Procedure 23 was
construed to mean that "when the death [of the person allegedly
liable] occurs, the operation of the statute of limitations is im-
mediately suspended, or cut off, and whatever then remained of the
time . . . still remain[s] when the suspension ceases." 24 Subse-
quently, in In the Matter of Estate of Morris,25 which cited Hall
v. Brennan as a direct precedent, CPA § 21 was held to mean that
a period of eighteen months was to be excluded from the computa-
tion of the limitation period upon the death of the potential de-
fendant.
The instant case, by interpreting CPLR 210(b) as establish-
ing an alternative date rather than an extension of the limitation
period, seems to be at odds with both the intent of the legislature and
prior case law.2 6 Since a potential plaintiff is unable to bring suit
197B McKiNNr's CPLR 210(b), commentary 210 (1963). Under the
CPA sections, different extensions were available dependent upon the place
of death. If within the state, section 21 applied, and an absolute eighteen-
month extension from date of death was granted. Under section 21 a
plaintiff was given an additional year within which to bring suit if letters
testamentary were not issued within six months of the end of the eighteen-
month extension. Such provision has been replaced by allowing claimant
to apply for letters under Section 119 of the Surrogates Court Act.
CPA § 12 suspended the running of the statute of limitations for
eighteen months from the issuance of the letters testamentary when the
death of the potential defendant was outside the state. However, CPLR
210(b) is unconcerned with locus of death, and extends the time to bring
suit for eighteen months from the death of the party allegedly liable.
2050 Misc. 2d 200, 266 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1966).
211d. at 201, 266 N.Y.S2d at 874-75.
22 140 N.Y. 409 (1893).
23 Section 403 provides that "a period of eighteen months is not a part
of the time limited for the commencement of an action against the executor
or administrator."
24 Hall v. Brennan, 140 N.Y. 409, 413 (1893).
25 162 Misc. 378, 294 N.Y. Supp. 622 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1937).
See an historical study of predecessors to CPA §21 and CPLR 210(b) in
Matter of McCormick, 169 Misc. 672, 8 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Surr. Ct. Kings County
1938).
28 See Butler v. Price, 271 App. Div. 359, 65 N.Y.S.2d 688 (4th Dep't
1946).
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between the time that the potential defendant dies and an adminis-
trator or executor is appointed, the effect of the court's decision
herein is to shorten the limitation period rather than to allow the
plaintiff an additional period of time. For example, in a wrongful
death action for which the limitation period is only two years
2
7
the death of the defendant followed by a lapse of eighteen months
until an administrator or executor is appointed would, under the
interpretation of the instant case, leave the plaintiff only six months
in which to bring suit. Instead of aiding the plaintiff, this deci-
sion hinders him.
CPLR 215(3): Complaint alleging corrupt conduct and intentionat
exposure to unreasonable, foreseeable risk of
harm states a cause of action.
In Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co.,2 8 the complaint al-
leged that defendants induced plaintiff, a university professor, to ap-
pear on their "rigged" television quiz program by intentional misrep-
resentations as to the show's legitimacy. Plaintiff further alleged that
when the program was exposed as a fraud, his academic position
was damaged, viz., fellowships previously applied for were denied,
and his good reputation was generally harmed. The appellate divi-
sion, first department, held that although the facts did not comprise
a single complete traditional tort, they did create an actionable
basis for relief since the defendants' intentionally false statements
foreseeably exposed plaintiff to a known, unreasonable risk of harm
and thereby directly damaged him 9
The torts of prima facie tort,30 deceit,3' defamation 3 2 and
negligence 33 were considered by the court. However, since the
complaint failed to allege all the elements necessary to sustain a
cause of action under any of the categories relied upon, each was
27 N.Y. DzcED. EST. LAW § 130.
28 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406 (lst Dep't 1965).
209 Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 266
N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't 1965).
ao Prima facie torts are those intentional wrongs whereby otherwise
lawful means are employed unjustifiably and maliciously, solely to harm
others. Here, the defendants' actions, though not illegal, were initially and
intrinsically unlawful; therefore the remedy of prima facie tort was not
available.
31 This was considered because plaintiff relied reasonably on defendants'
knowing misrepresentations to his detriment. Since, however, no goods or
services of the plaintiff were transferred to the defendants, deceit was not
completed and was eliminated as a remedy.
32 An action for damage to reputation, the classic result of defamation,
was brought. However, the essential element of publication about plaintiff
by the defendants was not alleged and defamation was thus unavailable
as a remedy.
33 Negligence was considered, but eliminated, since intentional means
were employed by the defendants.
